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Abstract—Historically, little more than lip service has been
paid to the rights of individuals to act to preserve their own pri-
vacy. Personal information is frequently exploited for commercial
gain, often without the person’s knowledge or permission. New
legislation, such as the EU General Data Protection Regulation
Act, has acknowledged the need for legislative protection. This
Act places the onus on service providers to preserve the confi-
dentiality of their users’ and customers’ personal information,
on pain of punitive fines for lapses. It accords special privileges
to users, such as the right to be forgotten. This regulation
has global jurisdiction covering the rights of any EU resident,
worldwide. Assuring this legislated privacy protection presents a
serious challenge, which is exacerbated in the cloud environment.
A considerable number of actors are stakeholders in cloud
ecosystems. Each has their own agenda and these are not
necessarily well aligned. Cloud service providers, especially those
offering social media services, are interested in growing their
businesses and maximising revenue. There is a strong incentive
for them to capitalise on their users’ personal information and
usage information. Privacy is often the first victim. Here, we
examine the tensions between the various cloud actors and
propose a framework that could be used to ensure that privacy
is preserved and respected in cloud systems.
Index Terms—Cloud, Cloud actors, Privacy, Confidentiality
I. INTRODUCTION
In the decade since the introduction of the cloud computing
paradigm, we have seen a significant shift in cloud capabilities.
In 2011, NIST [1, p.2] provided an updated definition of what
cloud computing is, explaining that the essential characteristics
of the cloud are (1) on-demand self service, (2) broad network
access, (3) resource pooling, (4) rapid elasticity, and (5)
measured service
Since this definition was formulated, the capabilities of
cloud, and the uses to which it can be put, have evolved
considerably. It is perhaps inevitable that hackers have turned
their attention to cloud as well, with some success as recent
attacks demonstrate [2]. Successful hacks leak data, and pri-
vacy violations become a huge concern. We have to take a
close look at the parameters of this problem, to consider how
to formalise better mechanisms for preserving the privacy of
everyone using the cloud.
Of interest, here, is the number of different actors involved
in the cloud ecosystem. This has rendered the environment far
more complex than traditional distributed network systems.
The number of actors has increased considerably, to include
both programmatic and human actors. The number of bad
actors carrying out attacks has increased exponentially [3],
[4], [5], [6], [7]. We can see that the time between breach
and discovery has been steadily falling between 2012 and
2016. This can be attributed in some way to the impact of
efforts of companies to improve security in light of the need to
comply with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
This momentum was rather lost when some serious lobbying
resulted in a change from the requirement to report a breach
within 72 hours of occurrence to within 72 hours of discovery,
as evidenced by the 2017 breach report [8], where the time
between breach and discovery returned to near 2012 levels in
the space of a year. Of significance throughout this period is
the alarming increase in attack volume throughout, yearly.
While cloud users have been quick to exploit the op-
portunities offered by cloud, so too have bad actors been
keen to exploit its inherent vulnerabilities. Hackers are now
specifically targetting the cloud [9] so all stakeholders really
cannot afford to neglect cloud security. This is not a simple
task, as [10] points out. He refers to the “The Inevitability of
Combinatorial Risk” due to technical interdependencies and
the multiple actors involved in the system.
In addition, we have seen a significant change in the
way governments approach security and privacy concerns. Of
particular interest is the new EU GDPR [11], which brings
to bear very significant penalties for non-compliance in the
event of a security breach. Furthermore, jurisdiction is now
global, instead of EU-wide only. This is likely to encourage
other jurisdictions to strengthen their own security and privacy
legislation, which, to date, have been rather poorly framed.
In Section II, we present the core principles of privacy.
In Section III, we consider the range of vulnerabilities in
cloud ecosystems that must be addressed in order to ensure
a high level of security and privacy can be achieved. Then,
in Section IV, we look at how the actors involved in cloud
ecosystems have evolved during the past decade. In Section
V, we develop a framework to address how to defend against
such vulnerabilities. In Section VI, we consider the anticipated
manner in which the framework might be deployed, and in
Section VII, we discuss our conclusions.
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II. PRIVACY AND THE CLOUD
Privacy researchers have expressed concerns about com-
puter users divulging too much information [12], not appre-
ciating or valuing their personal information and giving it
away unthinkingly, unwittingly sacrificing their privacy [13].
As governments move to put all their citizens’ details online
[14], utilizing cloud services to do so, the potential for privacy
invasion increases the consequences disastrous [15].
Privacy is undoubtedly a complicated concept [16]. Solove
explains that privacy is “an umbrella term, referring to a
wide and disparate group of related things” [17, p.485].
Privacy, according to Privacy International, who are more
specific, is a multidimensional concept, which is related to
four components: (1) body, (2) communications, (3) territory,
and (4) information. When it comes to the cloud, our interest
is in the second and fourth of these.
Privacy is a human right in Europe, and the United Kingdom
is a signatory of the European Convention of Human Rights.
Article 8 of the Convention [18] states that EU citizens have
the right to respect for private and family life. In particular,
the State may only interfere with this right proportionally, in
accordance with law and in the interests of national security,
public safety, and for the prevention of crime. Yet the public at
large seems to accept widespread privacy violations, seemingly
without protesting [19], [20], [21].
Yet the UK government itself does not seem to respect
their citizens’ privacy rights. The UK government recently
passed the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA). Part 4 of the Act
requires web and phone companies to retain all data logs
pertaining to their customers’ activities for two years. They
are required, upon request, to provide these to official bodies
without judicial oversight, not respecting privacy.
Privacy and confidentiality are aligned yet conceptually dif-
ferent terms, which are often conflated. For example, Meriam
Webster defines privacy as “freedom from unauthorized intru-
sion”, “seclusion” and “secrecy”. Confidentiality is defined as
“private, secret”. Yet these concepts are very different. The
ISO/IEC 29100 [22] provides a more specific definition of
the privacy principle: “specific choices made by a personally
identifiable information (PII) principal about how their PII
should be processed for a particular purpose”. The ISO/IEC
27001 [23] definition of confidentiality is: “that information is
not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals,
entities, or processes”. This distinction is important when we
start considering privacy and the cloud.
The introduction of the GDPR is said to be “the most impor-
tant change in data privacy regulation in 20 years” [11]. The
legislation came into force on the 25th May 2018, and replaced
the existing Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. Organisations
that fail to comply will be subject to significant fines. GDPR is
essentially linked to confidentiality; the requirement for cloud
service providers is to ensure that personal data provided, or
stored, by their users is secured and not leaked.
This means that cloud providers have to start taking con-
fidentiality seriously, but little advice is offered to cloud
providers in this respect. The Information Commissioner’s
website offers advice to the man and woman in the street, but
not to cloud service providers [24]. In this paper, we propose
a framework that will fill this gap.
III. RANGE OF VULNERABILITIES IN CLOUD ECOSYSTEMS
Due to the nature of the cloud ecosystem, and the various
actors involved in the provision of cloud services, cloud users
are at risk from cloud-specific threats and vulnerabilities. A
cloud-based attack can have huge economic ramifications,
comparable to that of a major natural disaster [25]. The
range of vulnerabilities can be demonstrated by looking at the
OWASP Top 10 risk tables for 2017. The first one addresses
Web based weaknesses:
• A1:2017 — Injection
• A2:2017 — Broken Authentication
• A3:2017 — Sensitive Data Exposure
• A4:2017 — XML External Entities (XXE)
• A5:2017 — Broken Access Control
• A6:2017 — Security Misconfiguration
• A7:2017 — Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
• A8:2017 — Insecure Deserialization
• A9:2017 — Using Components with Known Vulnerabil-
ities
• A10:2017 — Insufficient Logging & Monitoring
The next Top 10 list considers Cloud specific risks:
• Accountability & Data Risk;
• User Identity Federation;
• Legal & Regulatory Compliance;
• Business Continuity & Resiliency;
• User Privacy & Secondary Usage of Data;
• Service & Data Integration;
• Multi-tenancy & Physical Security;
• Incidence Analysis & Forensics;
• Infrastructure Security;
• Non-production Environment Exposure.
We should also consider potential IoT weaknesses, since
many cloud systems have enabled IoT use, and therefore are
exposed to IoT vulnerabilities:
• Insecure Web Interface;
• Insufficient Authentication/Authorization;
• Insecure Network Services;
• Lack of Transport Encryption;
• Privacy Concerns;
• Insecure Cloud Interface;
• Insecure Mobile Interface;
• Insufficient Security Configurability;
• Insecure Software Firmware;
• Poor Physical Security.
Since mobile communication also forms an intrinsic part of the
Cloud and IoT — we should also take account of the potential
impact of Mobile vulnerabilities. To this end, we consider the
OWASP top 10 of Mobile Vulnerabilities:
• M1 — Improper Platform Usage;
• M2 — Insecure Data Storage;
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• M3 — Insecure Communication;
• M4 — Insecure Authentication;
• M5 — Insufficient Cryptography;
• M6 — Insecure Authorisation;
• M7 — Client Code Quality;
• M8 — Code Tampering;
• M9 — Reverse Engineering;
• M10 — Extraneous Functionality.
In the UK, the Information Commission Office (ICO) is
the body that is responsible for the provision of individual
rights with respect to data privacy. But, over the last decade
cloud computing has been afforded little attention from this
body. Yet, in 2015, the ICO’s ‘Annual Track Report’ reported
that it was established that out of a survey sample of 2,465
respondents, 60% stated that they had some apprehension
with respect to cloud computing [26]. Such apprehension is
well grounded, as demonstrated by some recent attacks [2].
Insurance companies like Lloyds are warning of the possibility
of huge losses related to cloud attacks [27].
Cloud security issues were also identified by the Cloud
Security Alliance (CSA), in their list of the cloud computing
notorious nine security risks [28] with the cloud ecosystem
being considered susceptible to: data loss, data breach, account
hijacking, insecure API’s, denial of service, malicious insider,
insufficient due diligence, cloud abuse and share technology.
There is also a very important point to take into account
here. We have looked at a range of ”top 10” vulnerabilities.
It is vitally important to realise that there are far more than
the ten vulnerabilities in each of these areas. For example, in
the case of IoT vulnerabilities, OWASP has identified a total
of 94 IoT vulnerabilites that remain to be resolved. Thus, in
every single case, it will be vital to not just consider the top
10 vulnerabilities, but to address all potential vulnerabilities
to which the company will be exposed.
Due to the nature of cloud, mitigation of these risk is often
outside the control of a cloud user. Hence, on occasions when
security breaches and security failures do occur, it may be
impossible for a client to identify the responsible actor, which,
in turn, could lead to tension between actors.
There is a particular issue that must be taken into account
with cloud systems, and that is the so called Cloud Forensic
Problem [29], [30]. This arises when an attacker gains even
a small foothold in a cloud system. Once there, the attacker
seeks to escalate privileges to gain access to the forensic logs,
which allows them to modify or delete all traces of their
incursion into the cloud system. This allows the attacker to
become a more permanent intruder, resulting in their capability
to access considerably more information over the longer term,
while remaining hidden. There is nothing within a cloud
system to prevent this from occurring.
We need also to consider the damage insiders can cause
from within the company, due to poorly updated processes,
poorly configured IT resources and vulnerabilities [31].
Other issues are poorly defined policies, lack of attention to
server logs and other aspects that are relatively easy things
to police if only the cloud provider takes the time to do
so. Finally, there are the malware attacks, such as the Mirai
virus attack on cheap Internet of Things (IoT) devices [32]. It
subsequently spread to corporate Windows desktops [33], thus
facilitating the leveraging of compromised IoT networks into
other more valuable corporate systems.
IV. ACTORS INVOLVED IN CLOUD ECOSYSTEMS
Once cloud started to gain traction just over a decade ago, it
offered some interesting opportunities to companies in terms
of the ease with which they could provision IT resources.
Many assumed it was just the cloud user and the cloud service
provider who were the solo actors in the equation, but there
were far more than that even 10 years ago. Cloud Service
Providers (CSPs) made much of how committed they were
to vetting all their staff members properly. However, little was
said about the need to hire in temporary staff on an emergency
basis, where often such agency companies were much less
rigorous in their vetting processes [34].
Similarly, many of the services offered were not actually
provided by the CSPs themselves. Often third party providers
were used who had much less rigorous approaches to issues
of security, privacy and confidentiality. CSPs were often less
than transparent about where the data in their cloud offerings
would reside, and even less transparent about who access it.
This would give rise to significant issues for European
companies who were using cloud, since EU legislative and
regulatory recommendations were to only use cloud provided
by companies resident within the EU. The European base for
Amazon Web Services (AWS) is in Ireland, a European com-
pany, so it might be assumed that anyone using such a service
would be compliant. However, that would not necessarily be
the case, as AWS also have data centres on the East and West
coasts of the USA as well as data centres in the Far East[35].
In the interests of availability, AWS frequently would place
copies of both software systems and data in other data centres
in the interests of resilience, to ensure that recovery from
any possible breakdown of services, or a major cyber breach,
would be instantaneous. No mention of the possibilities that
security standards in each physical location would be of the
same high standard. An unwelcome byproduct of this arrange-
ment would be a possible unexpected and unwelcome exposure
to foreign legal jurisdiction, even where the company does
not trade in that jurisdiction. In US legislation, for example,
running software on a US based system automatically extends
their jurisdiction over that company and exposes them to the
full penalties of the law.
Contractors, consultants and many other parties will also
be involved in a cloud ecosystem. Likewise, within a cloud
user company, there will also be the need for temporary
staff, contractors and consultants, many of whom will, of
necessity, have direct access to cloud systems. This introduces
a significant degree of complexity to the management of such
systems and opens up a huge range of potential exposure and
vulnerability to attack.
However, the problem does not end there. Cloud was
instrumental in energising the take up of Big Data, and both
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have been great enablers for the Internet of Things (IoT). This
means that there are now a considerable range of software
actors to add to the mix. IoT systems require access to cloud
systems where data is stored, processed, analysed and so on.
In addition, many of these systems are highly insecure and
vulnerable to a range of attacks.
IoT services such as: Domestic and Home Automation,
eHealth, Industrial Control, Logistics, Retail, Security and
Emergencies, Self Driving Cars and Trucks, Smart Agricul-
ture, Smart Animal Farming, Smart Cities, Smart Environ-
ment, Smart Water, Smart Metering, Smart Transport and
Smart Utilities have all placed additional stresses on cloud
computing. As dumb (and sometimes not so dumb) actors,
these can also open up more and more vulnerabilities [36].
This also means that the complexity of handling cloud
systems has increased exponentially in the decade since the
cloud paradigm really started to gain serious traction. That
increase in complexity presents a considerable increase in the
risks associated with trying to ensure that a proper and secure
environment can be developed to safeguard the security and
privacy of customers and enable companies to be compliant
with legislation and regulation.
V. DEVELOPING A CLOUD SECURITY AND PRIVACY
FRAMEWORK
In developing a framework suitable for ensuring that an
adequate level of security can be achieved by a cloud-using
organisation, we need to consider three separate layers.
The first layer we must consider is our security and
privacy goals, which will comprise the traditional triad of
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability, along with any new
goals we would care to add, such as Audit and Forensic Trails.
The second layer we must consider is the systems architec-
ture of the company, which comprises any traditional systems,
services and applications, plus cloud services, such as IaaS,
PaaS and SaaS.
The third layer is the Business Architecture of a company,
which comprises a combination of (a) People, (b) Process and
(c) Technology [37].
We illustrate this in Figure 1, where each of the layers is
described as an axis point on the model. Where any point of
confluence between the three axes occurs, we can very clearly
articulate what we seek to address for our security and privacy
concerns. Thus, at any particular intersection we can identify
what the specific goal will be.
This first stage of developing the framework will allow us
to set the declared policies the business will seek to achieve
by addressing each of the confluence points.
However, this represents the goals at a high level of ab-
straction. We can subdivide each of the axes into smaller
components. Thus, for example, Z1 could be broken down to
identify each individual in the company using their ID code.
Y6 can be broken down into each specific application in use.
X4 can be broken down into the Audit trail requirement for
each application, and so on. By this means, we can increase
the granularity of addressed details, retaining essential details.
Figure. 1. A Cloud Three-Dimensional Policy Framework Matrix.
(X=Security Properties; Y=System Architecture; Z=Business Architecture;
0=Origin)
The next stage will be to consider all known vulnerabilities
against each area on the matrix. Thus social engineering
attacks would principally relate to Z1, database injection
attacks would relate to all instances which use databases on
the Y axis, and so on. For each of these attacks, we can collect
signatures to identify how each attack can be perpetrated, and
can utilise these later for attack detection purposes.
We could also consider adding a risk layer to quantify our
perception of risk attaching to each coordinate in the matrix,
thus allowing us to evaluate the potential adverse impact of
any consequential breach.
For the high-level matrix, we can also borrow from eco-
nomic utility theory, for example [38], [39], which would
allow us to incorporate a simple utility model into these
relationships to provide a weighting to express the preferences
of the business. This will allow us to develop a simple means
of tailoring the model to suit any business.
Thus, to represent the policy of the business at an initial
high level of abstraction, there would be three main aims for
each of the relationships defined in the model: 1) to provide
a mechanism for measurement; 2) to define a target position;
3) to define a utility preference over the target.
To illustrate this point: if we consider coordinate (X3,
Y3, Z2): representing “availability for applications to run
processes”.
For each such component of the policy framework model,
as specified in Figure 1, that is of interest — let’s assume
we index these components by a variable i — we associate a
component Ui of a utility function, as follows:
• Measure: Mi; for example, % uptime of systems hard-
ware; in this case, expressed as an average over time;
• Target: mi, the declarative target for this operation;
• A function fi expressing how utility depends on deviation
from target. For example, a Linex function [40], usually
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expressed in the form g(z) = (exp(αz) − αz − 1)/α2,
is used to capture a degree of asymmetry that is param-
eterized by α;
• The weight wi (between 0 and 1, and
∑
i wi = 1)
expressing the managers’ weighting/preference for the ith
security component of interest;
• This can be expressed thus: Ui = wifi(Mi −mi);
• System equation Mi = si(xi), where xi is a vector of
control variables and si describes Mi’s dependency upon
them.
Thus the overall utility function is
U =
∑
i
Ui =
∑
i
wifi(Mi −mi).
We can obtain a treatment of the expected utility of the
system by introducing suitable stochastic processes into the
system functions si. In general, such treatment of a system’s
properties will be too complex to have analytic solutions
for the control variables, thus simulations must be used. By
evaluating each co-ordinate in the policy framework layer, the
business can define their position on the security risks they
face and the resulting utility model of the whole will reflect the
level of utility they seek, while ensuring compliance with any
legislation, regulation and standards. It will also be possible
to place constraints on the targets. For example, in the above
example, the target may be 99.99%, but the constraint may
be that availability should never fall below 98%. In analysing
all the co-ordinates of this model, it may be that some threats
are subsidiary to others, and that by securing the main threat,
this eliminates the subsidiary threats, although this may not
always be the case. Each business can take a view on whether
they cover these threats individually, or as related groups,
depending on what would be appropriate to suit particular
needs.
VI. ANTICIPATED USAGE OF THE CLOUD SECURITY AND
PRIVACY FRAMEWORK
Now that we have developed a framework to address our
needs, we need to understand how we might anticipate its
usage in practice. The framework allows us to define what
our cloud security and privacy goals are, and to identify how
important they are to the company. As it is the company that
is responsible for ensuring the security and privacy of PII, on
pain of potentially significant fines, the company is therefore
accountable for its actions.
Having identified what the security and privacy goals are,
we have a good starting point to begin using the framework.
In order to understand and measure the degree to which a
company using this framework would be compliant, we need
to examine our systems to see what has actually transpired
during the period under examination. We can examine audit
trails, forensic trails, system logs and carry out whatever other
analytics are necessary to identify what exactly has been
happening during the period under scrutiny. By compiling the
metrics we seek to use to reflect real events, we can now
compare those against the targets we have set for compliance.
Again, to use an example from the previous section, in looking
at that example, if our target is 99.99% and the constraint is a
minimum of 98%, then if our actual figure shows 95%, then we
will have failed our minimum compliance test. With a result
of 98.5%, we would have passed our minimum compliance
target of 98%, but failed our ultimate goal of 99.99%.
In the event that we fail on any part of the framework,
we can then investigate to understand whether the failure
arises due to an as yet unidentified attack, or from some
other performance failure. In this way, we can identify where
our weaknesses lie and take corrective action to ensure these
failures do not arise again. If, on the other hand, we discover
that an attack has occurred, then we will be in a good position
to effect immediate action. Given the average time between
breach and discovery of 200 days [41], we will find ourselves
in a much stronger position than we otherwise might.
This will give us the comfort that we can identify poor
performance and can quantify what that might be, also that
we might identify any attack that has been perpetrated, and
pick up the fact considerably in advance of the time in which
we might otherwise be able to detect it.
For those users who do not have a high level of understand-
ing of cyber security issues, there is an alternative, simpler
approach to take. The user can make a list of all the known vul-
nerabilities already listed by the CSA and OWASP, to which
they can add vulnerability lists from any other sources. Each
vulnerability can be classified according to the framework
matrix. As new vulnerabilities are discovered, these can be
added, thus building up a more complete framework over time.
Once they have specified their performance targets, they can
no run their systems through the various open source tools to
see which vulnerabilities are present in their systems, which
they can then address. By regularly measuring performance
using the framework matrix, they will be able to ensure they
are addressing all the most important vulnerabilities.
However, these are not the only ways we can use the
framework. Should we decide to implement an intrusion
detection system, we will have identified the main known vul-
nerabilities to which our systems architecture are vulnerable,
and can implement the necessary patterns into the intrusion
detection software, meaning that we will be better placed to
discover the occurrence of such attacks. While that will still
leave us exposed to new attacks, which would be the case
regardless of whether we operated the framework or not, there
is a possibility that something uncharacteristic will show up
somewhere in the system as a consequence of the intrusion.
VII. CONCLUSION
Thus we can see that using this framework, it will be possi-
ble to improve our security and privacy posture in the business.
We will be able to detect where poor performance impacts on
security and privacy compliance, but more importantly, where
a breach does occur, we will have an advanced warning of
that fact and will be able to do something constructive about
it long in advance of what might be possible otherwise.
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It is certainly the case that the sooner we are in a position to
discover the incidence of an attack having arisen, the sooner
we can take defensive and corrective action. If we have take
a sensible approach to holding data in encrypted form, then
we are likely to be significantly mitigate the impact of any
potential breach. There is no doubt that breaches will arise,
but the more we can do to mitigate the impact, the better it
will be for all concerned, and in particular the users who have
no real control over what might happen to their PII.
Given the misalignment of the agendas of all the actors in
cloud ecosystems, it is likely that the use of our proposed
framework will provide a much more secure environment for
retaining users’ PII, and thus reducing the impact of any breach
we sustain to a considerable extent.
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